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The trade policy of the United States (U.S.) traditionally relied almost exclusively 
on multilateral negotiations in the context of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) and avoided bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs), except 
with countries whose import tariffs had little effect on the direction of trade.1 This 
changed in 1985 when the United States concluded a free trade agreement with 
Israel. As Gantz explains, “the year 1985 marked a pivotal period in U.S. foreign 
trade policy. The United States began to depart from its long-standing opposition 
to regional trade agreements.”2 The conclusion of the Canada-United States Free 
Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) in 1987 led to the conclusion of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 and, subsequently, to the Free Trade 
Areas of the Americas initiative.3 After 2000, the United States sought to densify 
their FTAs network and by 2015 gradually concluded bilateral4 and plurilateral5 
free trade agreements with a total of 25 countries. The Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP), currently under negotiation, will be added to this 
network. Interestingly enough, the United States concluded free trade agreements 
mostly with economically and politically weaker countries that had much to gain 
from access to the U.S. market and had little significance for U.S. trade.6 In contrast, 
the United States have no free trade agreements with some of their major trading 
partners, namely, China and the European Union even though the United Kingdom, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and France in the aggregate account for more 
than China in total export value for goods.7 
In his introduction in this volume, Gantz attributes the change in the U.S. 
policy to the slow progress of the European countries towards economic integration 
in the 1970s and the early 1980s, as well as to the increase of the European trade 
power and the lack of European support for a new GATT negotiating round, leading 
1 Sidney Weintraub, Some Implications of U.S. Trade Agreements with Chile and 
Singapore 8 (LAEBA, Working Paper No.14, Jun. 2003), available at http://www19.
iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2010/06219.pdf (last visited Jul. 20, 2016).
2 David Gantz, The ‘Bipartisan Trade Deal,’ Trade Promotion Authority and the Future of 
U.S. Free Trade Agreements, 28 St. louiS u. l. rev. 116 (2008).
3 Weintraub, supra note 1, at 8.
4 Australia (2005), Bahrain (2006), Canada (1987), Chile (2004), Colombia (2011), Israel 
(1985), Jordan (2001), South Korea (2011), Morocco (2006), Oman (2006), Panama 
(2011), Peru (2007), Singapore (2004).
5 NAFTA with Canada, Mexico (1994), Dominican Republic-Central America Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Dominican Republic (2006) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) with 
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, 
Vietnam (2015).
6 Bernard K. Gordon, By Invitation Only: Cozy Free Trade Deals Subvert Global 
Integration, yale gloBal online, Feb. 13, 2003, available at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/
content/invitation-only-cozy-free-trade-deals-subvert-global-integration (last visited 
Jul. 20, 2016). 
7 See, Top U.S. Trade Partners Ranked by 2014 U.S. Total Export Value for Goods, 
available at http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg_ian/documents/
webcontent/tg_ian_003364.pdf (last visited Jul. 20, 2016).
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the United States to take regional initiatives. Concerns over the U.S. expansion 
led Europeans to agree to new multilateral negotiations while the stalemate of the 
Uruguay Round offered the United States, Canada and Mexico the opportunity to 
conclude the NAFTA. Subsequently, after the failure of the Doha Development 
Round, the United States saw in free trade agreements more than a second best 
approach to trade liberalization, an opportunity to broaden trade liberalization to the 
global level and influence the content of future international trade rules.8 Griffith, 
Steinberg & Zysman explain in that respect that “[b]y negotiating deals one-by-one 
with individual countries, the US was able to leverage its power, securing deeper 
liberalization and a more complex trade agenda than could be advanced in the 
[World Trade Organization] WTO, where US trade bargaining power was more 
diffused than in one-on-one negotiations.” Furthermore, pursuing the strategy of 
competitive liberalization, the United States expected that “once a critical mass 
of bilateral agreements were achieved, states not party to these agreements would 
be inclined to liberalize along similar lines in order to avoid trade and investment 
diversion, and to remain competitive in a global economy.”9 According to Bergsten, 
the United States thus hoped “to place pressure on non-members of individual free 
trade agreements either to join the group itself or to conclude broader agreement.”10
This change of the U.S. policy may have wide-ranging repercussions for the 
future international rules of trade. Already, the size of the U.S. economy and the 
consequent desire of other countries to become preferential U.S. trading partners11 
allowed the proliferation of U.S. free trade agreements. Since the 2000s, the 
extension of the U.S. FTAs network along with the reaction of the European Union 
(EU) to the risk of losing privileged access to markets covered by the U.S. free 
trade agreements and the consequent “competitive attitude between the EU and the 
US, in terms of gaining preferential market access and extending regulatory rules 
to emerging countries,”12 led to the generalized shift from multilateral negotiations 
to plurilateral and bilateral preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Weintraub 
claims that “the United States over the past few years concluded as a policy matter 
that it should be prepared to negotiate in many forums - global, as in the World 
Trade Organization … regional, as in the Free Trade Areas of the Americas … 
plurilateral, as in the ongoing negotiations … to achieve a U.S.-Central American 
Free Trade Area … and bilaterally, as it did with Jordan and now with Singapore.”13 
This shift to bilateralism and regionalism was interpreted as a division of labor, 
placing liberalization “at the level where it is easiest to achieve, for whatever reason 
(geographical proximity, power relations, etc.), while maintaining regulation at the 
8 David Gantz, Introduction to U.S. Free Trade Agreements, 5 Br. J. am. legal Stud. 
302-06 (2016).
9 Melissa K. Griffith, Richard Steinberg & John Zysman, Great Power Politics in A 
Global Economy: Origins and Consequences of the TPP and TTIP, the Berkeley 
roundtaBle on the international economy, available at http://www.brie.berkeley.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Great-Power-Politics-in-a-Global-Economy-Origins-and-
Consequences-of-the-TPP-and-TTIP.pdf (last visited Jul. 20, 2016).
10 Fred C. Bergsten, A Competitive Approach to Free Trade, Financial timeS, Dec. 4, 2002, 
available at https://piie.com/commentary/op-eds/competitive-approach-free-trade.
11 Gordon, supra note 6. 
12 André Sapir, Europe and the Global Economy, in Fragmented power: europe and the 
gloBal economy 13 (André Sapir ed., 2007).
13 Weintraub, supra note 1, at 8.
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global level”, an argument deduced from references to WTO rules in most free 
trade agreements.14 However, the proliferation of free trade agreements, apart from 
the risk of discrepancies between the different agreements as a result of the so-
called spaghetti bowl phenomenon,15 may lead to marginalization of the WTO as a 
privileged forum of negotiation of international trade rules. 
Along with this vertical forum shifting, the United States - and the European 
Union - using their increased bargaining power, introduced bilateral commitments 
going beyond those that their partners have accepted at the multilateral level (WTO-
Plus) as well as provisions dealing with issues lying outside the current WTO 
mandate (WTO-Extra). The first relate to the liberalization of trade in goods and 
services, whereas the second relate to investment protection, competition policy, 
labor standards, and protection of the environment.16 To some extent, the United 
States traded WTO-Plus provisions in return for WTO-Extra obligations. They thus 
achieved with economically and politically weaker partners what they could not 
achieve through the WTO.17 Indeed, the U.S. free trade agreements are amongst the 
most prominent examples of asymmetric preferential trade agreements.18 The gains 
reaped by the United States include the increased access to their trading partners’ 
markets without them having to liberalize in return traditionally protected sectors 
such as agriculture, steel and textiles.19 Furthermore, the United States exported their 
regulatory rules in a number of areas,20 in order to further their domestic interests or 
respond to domestic concerns. In relation to intellectual property rules (IPRs), for 
example, Mercurio rightly explains that “[a]s a result of the strong and unwavering 
resistance” of developing countries during the Seattle and the Doha Rounds “the US 
has again shifted its negotiating focus and sought to use bilateralism/regionalism to 
increase IPRs by requiring FTA partners to implement TRIPS-Plus provisions.”21 
These provisions are not necessarily beneficial to U.S. trading partners. In this 
volume, Tully observes that by concluding bilateral and regional agreements, the 
United States “is gaining greater influence over the domestic health care and drug 
coverage programs of its trading partners.”22 Cai adds that the recent U.S. free trade 
14 Hélène Ruiz-Fabri, Regulating trade, Investment and Money, in the camBridge companion 
to international law 357 (James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2012).
15 JagdiSh Bhagwati, termiteS in the trading SyStem: how preFerential agreementS 
undermine Free trade 61-70 (2008). 
16 Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis & André Sapir, EU and U.S. Preferential Trade 
Agreements: Deepening or Widening of WTO Commitments, in preFerential trade 
agreementS: a law and economicS analySiS 151-52 (Kyle W. Bagwell & Petros C. 
Mavroidis eds., 2011).
17 Cf. Meredith Kolsky Lewies, The Politics and Indirect Effects of Asymmetrical 
Bargaining Power in Free Trade Agreements, in the politicS oF international economic 
law 19 (Tomer Broude, Marc L. Busch & Amelia Porges eds., 2011).
18 Vladimir G. Sherov-Ignatiev, & Sergei F. Sutyrin, Peculiarities and rationale of asymmetric 
regional trade agreements, wto reSearch and analySiS, https://www.wto.org/english/
res_e/publications_e/wtr11_forum_e/wtr11_2aug11_a_e.htm (last visited Jul. 20, 2016).
19 Weintraub, supra note 1, at 9; Gantz, supra, note 2, at 118.
20 Horn, Mavroidis & Sapir, supra note 16, at 169, Sapir supra, note 12, at 12.
21 Bryan Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends, in regional trade 
agreementS and the wto legal SyStem 219 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 
2006).
22 Stephen R. Tully, Free Trade Agreements with the United States: 8 Lessons for 
Prospective Parties from Australia’s Experience, 5 Br. J. am. legal Stud. 406 (2016).
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agreements introduce regulatory coherence obligations that promote a uniform 
OECD-inspired model of regulation that is already part of the U.S. regulatory 
toolbox, thus extending its reach to the U.S. trading partners.23 
Amidst the continuing stalemate of the global trade negotiations, one wonders 
what the effect of the proliferation of U.S. free trade agreements for the future 
international rules of trade will be. Will the densification of U.S. - and EU - PTAs 
networks lead to the disintegration of the WTO or will their rules be absorbed 
by future WTO agreements? Panezi in this volume explains that preferential trade 
agreements were formally allowed by the WTO on the assumption that “more 
liberalization, even if it occurs on the bilateral level, is better than no liberalization 
at all.”24 Sapir by contrast, underlines that U.S. and EU preferential trade agreements 
present a systemic challenge to the WTO25 and WTO officials themselves have 
voiced concerns over the risks of their proliferation.26 The densification of these 
networks could lead to the establishment of plurilateral rules involving the United 
States, the European Union and their respective partners or even to the creation of 
a U.S./EU-led trade organization with WTO rules remaining a second best choice 
for trading with the United States and the European Union. The Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (TPP) and the TTIP, as Pitschas in this volume explains, 
represent “a watershed for the multilateral trade system, just as TPP,”27 and may be 
the first steps towards that development. 
Nevertheless, one cannot exclude the possibility of a transition from bilateral 
and plurilateral to multilateral rules, as was the case with GATT.28 If, as Sapir claims, 
one of the main objectives of the TTIP “is for the EU and the US to change gear and 
adopt a more cooperative attitude at a time when their global economic leadership is 
more and more called into question by the emergence of new economic powers,”29 
the TTIP may then constitute the Trojan horse for them to regain control over 
multilateral trade negotiations. Some of their trading partners will voluntarily align 
with them whereas others will be coerced towards the multilateralization of what 
they have already agreed on the bilateral and the plurilateral levels, a strategy that 
has been used before in the case of TRIPS.30 The competitive liberalization strategy, 
envisaging that non-partners will join the group or conclude a broader agreement, 
accommodates both developments. Last but not least, one should not underestimate 
how U.S. free trade agreements may serve as models for future international trade 
23 Phoenix X.F. Cai, Regulatory Coherence and Standardization Mechanisms in the Trans-
Pacific Partnership, 5 Br. J. am. leg. Stud. 511 (2016).
24 Maria Panezi, The Two Noble Kinsmen: Internal and Legal Transparency in the WTO 
and Their Connection to Preferential and Regional Trade Agreements, 5 Br. J. am. leg. 
Stud. 554 (2016).
25 Sapir, supra note 12, at 12.
26 Horn, Mavroidis & Sapir, supra note 16, at 151.
27 Christian Pitschas, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): The Devil in 
Disguise or a Golden Opportunity to Build a Transatlantic Marketplace?, 5 Br. J. am. 
leg. Stud. 340 (2016).
28 John M. Kline & Rodney D. Ludema, Building a Multilateral Framework for Investment: 
Comparing the Development of Trade and Investment Accords, 6 tranSnat’l corp. 8 
(1997).
29 Sapir, supra note 12, at 13.
30 Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAs, ACTA and 
TPP, 18 J. intell. prop. l. 452 (2013).
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and investment rules. In this volume, Monardes, amongst others, points out the 
influence of NAFTA in the free trade agreements concluded among Latin American 
and between Latin American countries and Asia Pacific countries.31 Schill and Bray 
explain that NAFTA and the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaties have been 
the source of inspiration of the recent Mega-Regionals and other important trade 
and investment agreements.32 Finally, Voon and Sheargold observe the likelihood of 
TPP influencing many current and future PTAs’ negotiations.33
The shift from multilateralism to regionalism, plurilateralism and bilateralism 
in international trade negotiations, amongst others, changed the focus of the 
academic debate. The challenge of free trade agreements rather than of the WTO 
now occupy most of the discussions of the relevant epistemic communities all over 
the world; a trend that is likely to intensify since the conclusion of the TTP and 
the advancement of the negotiations on the TTIP. This special issue of the British 
Journal of American Legal Studies, conceived just before the unexpected conclusion 
of the TTP negotiations, responds to the need for research on the recent U.S. free 
trade agreements. It does not intend to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
problems related to the rise of these agreements or of the content of the agreements 
themselves. Its aim is rather to focus on selected issues arising from the different 
obligations included in these agreements. Twelve distinguished international trade 
and investment law scholars from accros the world were invited to explore key 
aspects of particular U.S. free trade agreements. Contributors were not restricted by 
a research agenda, their independence was respected and hence their approaches do 
not necessarily converge, even though all share similar concerns in relation to the 
expansion of the U.S. free trade agreements.
In his introduction David A. Gantz explores the historical changes in U.S. 
trade policy and the shift from the support of multilateral rules to the embracement 
of regional and bilateral trade agreements. Christian Pitschas focuses on the on-
going negotiations for the TTIP and on the possible impact of the TTIP on the 
multilateral trading system and developing countries. Tania Voon and Elizabeth 
Sheargold analyze the motives and the negotiation dynamics of the chapters 
relating to investment, services, intellectual property and regulatory coherence 
of the recently concluded TPP. Rodrigo Monardes analyzes the liberalization of 
trade in services under the NAFTA negative list approach on the basis of the Chile-
United States Free Trade Agreement. Relying on the experience of the Australia-
United States Free Trade Agreement, Stephen R. Tully discusses the standards of 
intellectual property protection and their impact for U.S. trading partners. Haydn 
Davies analyzes the effects of investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms of 
NAFTA, the European Union-Canada Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement, 
the TTP and the draft TTIP on national environmental rules and, in particular, on 
the precautionary principle. Stephan W. Schill and Heather L. Bray focus on the 
31 Rodrigo Monardes, Challenges for Countries in Trade in Services’ Negotiations with the 
NAFTA Approach: The Experience of Chile in the Free Trade Agreement with the United 
States, 5 Br. J. Am. Leg. Stud. 390-92 (2016).
32 Stephan W. Schill & Heather L. Bray, The Brave New (American) World of International 
Investment Law: Substantive Investment Protection Standards in Mega-Regionals, 5 Br. 
J. am. leg. Stud. 424 (2016).
33 Tania Voon & Elizabeth Sheargold, The Trans-Pacific Partnership, 5 Br. J. am. leg. 
Stud. 370 (2016).
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influence of NAFTA and U.S. practice on the substantive rules governing investor-
state relations of the Mega-Regionals. Jaemin Lee explores the dispute settlement’ 
provisions of the free trade agreements concluded between the United States and 
Korea, Peru, Panama and Colombia. Using the TPP as her primary example, Phoenix 
X. F. Cai analyzes regulatory coherence obligations and the role of international 
standard setting organizations. Maria Panezi, finally, examines the relation between 
preferential trade agreements and WTO rules with particular focus on the problem 
of transparency and the limits of the Doha Transparency Mechanisms. 
This special issue of the British Journal of American Legal Studies is the 
outcome of a collaborative effort. The editor would like to thank David A. Gantz 
for his input and suggestions during the discussions on the content of this volume 
as well as all contributors for generously agreeing to participate in this project 
respecting strict deadlines. The volume would not have been completed without the 
assistance of Daniel Gough who adapted the articles to the journal’s reference style 
and Zoë K. Millman who reviewed some of the articles and made corrections to the 
language and suggestions of style. Special thanks are also due to Anne Richardson 
Oakes for her encouragement, guidance and supervision as well as for her comments 
and assistance in the adaptation of the contributions to the journal’s standards.
Panayotis M. Protopsaltis
298
